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NOTES

The Emperor Is Still Naked: Why
the Protocol on the Rights of
Women in Africa Leaves Women
Exposed to More Discrimination
ABSTRACT

The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa entered into force in 2005.
Met with much celebrationfor the protection it would provide African
women, the Protocol was heralded as one of the most forward-looking
human rights instruments. Now, fifteen years after it was conceived,
the Protocoldeserves a full assessment of the issues that it has faced in
accession and will face in implementation. This Note analyzes the
way in which the Protocol was developed and the effect the Protocol's
language will have on its ability to achieve its object and purpose.
This Note contends that certain language is too narrow, creating an
over-specificity that will deter necessary countries from joining.
However, this Note also asserts that certain aspirationalprovisions of
the Protocol are overly broad, creating legal obligations that States
Parties will be unable to meet. Ultimately, African countries with
questionable women's rights records will refuse to sign-States Parties
will either be unable or unwilling to protect women to the extent
required, leaving women in the same position as before. Worse yet,
some States Parties may implement extreme measures that could
increasingly disadvantage women over time. By relying on Western
ideas of women's rights and without explicitly determining how or if
customary law will be considered in implementation, the Protocol
faces serious obstacles on the domestic level. This Note concludes by
asserting that unless States Parties consider a more grassroots,
community-oriented approach to implementing the Protocol, the
instrument's requirements will remain unrealized, and women in
Africa will remain marginalized.
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THE EMPEROR IS STILL NAKED?
An emperor who cared too much for clothes hired two men who
promised him the finest suit from the most beautiful cloth. This cloth,
they told him, was magical and invisible to anyone who was either
ignorant or not fit for his position. The Emperor, nervous because he
could not see the cloth himself, sent his ministers to view it. They too
saw nothing, yet praised the cloth. When the swindlers reported that
the suit had been fashioned, the Emperor allowed himself to be dressed
in their creation for a procession through town. During the procession,
the crowd "oohed" and "aahed," until a small child cried out, "He has
nothing on!" The crowd realized the child was telling the truth and
began laughing. The Emperor realized that the people were right as
well, but could not admit it. He thought it better to continue the
procession under the illusion that anyone who could not see his clothes
was either ignorant or incompetent. So he sat stiffly on his carriage,
1
while behind him a page held his imaginary mantle.

I. INTRODUCTION

The past few decades have shown an increasing appreciation for
women's rights around the world, particularly in Africa. 2 The most
recent indication of change in Africa was the 2003 adoption of an
additional protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights (Banjul Charter).3 Forty-three African states have signed this
human rights instrument, the Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa (Protocol), and, as recently as February 28, 2008, twenty-three
countries have ratified the instrument. 4 While the Protocol initially

1.
Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor's New Clothes, in FAIRY TALES
FROM HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSON, 215, 215-20 (Ernest Rhys ed., Turnbull and Spears
3rd ed. 1907) (1837), available at http:/books.google.comfbooks?id=bCwtAAAAMAAJ
&printsec=frontcover&dq=Tales+of+Hans+Christian+Andersen#PPP12,M1.
2.
Rachel Rebouch6, Labor, Land and Women's Rights in Africa: Challenges
for the New Protocol on the Rights of Women, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 235, 235 (2006)
(citing Vincent 0. Nmehielle, A Decade in Human Rights Law: Development of the
African Human Rights System in the Last Decade, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 6, 8 (2004)).
3.
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
58, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/zlafchar.htm
[hereinafter Banjul Charter].
The Banjul Charter has been ratified by all fifty-three member states of the
Organization of African Unity, now the African Union. African Union, List of Countries
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention on African
Charter on Human and People's Rights, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au
Documents/TreatiesfList/African%20Charter%20on%2OHuman%20and%20Peoples%20
Rights.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
4.
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, July li, 2003, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6, available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol%20on%20the%
20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf [hereinafter Protocol]. For a list of countries who have
signed, ratified, and deposited the Protocol, see BREATHING LIFE INTO THE AFRICAN
UNION PROTOCOL ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN AFRICA app. 3 (Roselynn Musa, Faiza Jama
Mohammed & Firoze Manji eds., 2006) [hereinafter BREATHING LIFE]; African Union,
List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,
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received international approbation for the protections it would offer
women, few have carefully examined if it has actually succeeded.
The Protocol was designed to protect women in a more
comprehensive manner than pre-existing instruments. 5 Despite an
international effort to eradicate all forms of discrimination against
women, the African Union recognized that women were still excluded
from legal, social, economic, and cultural processes. 6 The Protocol
was thus developed to protect African women from forms of
discrimination particular to Africa. 7 Drafters recognized the unique
conflict of laws that arose when courts and legislatures alike had to
decide between the application of international and domestic
statutory law and customary tribal law. 8 When opened to signature
in 2003, the international community praised the Protocol as the
most progressive tool for protecting women's rights to date. 9 It
guaranteed rights never before ensured in the international
community, such as the right to an abortion and HIV services.10
African governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and
international human rights groups touted the Protocol as a milestone
for women in Africa and worldwide.
However, the Protocol's aspirational language, coupled with its
legally binding nature, poses difficulties for States Parties. Limited
budgets and legal systems that waffle indeterminately between
respecting statutory obligations and cultural traditions constrain
many countries. Moreover, in the international context, the creation
of protocols has become an iterative process-an academic legal
exercise of sorts." Furthermore, the Protocol is both overbroad in
some sections and too narrow in scope in other sections.
It
guarantees rights that even the wealthiest of countries could not
ensure and specifically articulates measures that must be followed,
12
regardless of the context.
Unfortunately, these supposedly positive steps taken in the
Protocol may ultimately have a negative impact on women in Africa.
As States Parties realize that the ambitious rights guaranteed in the
Protocol are largely unattainable due to their countries' current

http://www.africa-union.org/root/au[Documents/TreatiesfList/Protocol%2on%20the%
20Rights%20of/o2OWomen.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2009) [hereinafter List of Protocol
Signatories].
5.
Protocol, supra note 4, pmbl.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
See infra Part II.B.
9.
Anne Gathumbi, Making Reproductive Health Rights a Reality, PAMBAZUKA
NEWS, Jan. 20, 2005, http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/26455.
10.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 14.
11.
Interview with Michael A. Newton, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University
Law School, in Nashville, Tenn. (Nov. 13, 2007).
12.
See Rebouch6, supra note 2, at 256 ("[Tlhe Protocol inadvertently replicates
the mistakes of its predecessors: powerful words without functional meaning.").
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conditions, they will abandon their efforts to meet their obligations.
Permitting an international obligation to go unmet may, over time,
create evidence of an acceptable customary international norm or
state practice that ultimately makes such illegal behavior legally
acceptable. 13 Even worse, in an effort to properly and immediately
implement the language of the Protocol, many countries have adopted
female quotas for government positions. 14 Actions like these create a
protected status for women, which might be beneficial for a short
period but over time may become limiting, stigmatizing, and contrary
to the progress needed for women's rights in Africa.
At the end of twenty years of development, accession, and
implementation, scholars and policymakers alike are left with several
questions: Should the Protocol be considered a success? Despite
overwhelming support from internationally active NGOs, will the
Protocol actually help women now and in the future? Or, upon closer
inspection, will the women's rights movement recognize that, indeed,
the Protocol is naked-dressed only in empty promises that have yet
to materialize? Most importantly, is it too late for the Protocol and
the women it was designed to protect? Has the Protocol already
paraded unadorned into the international arena to the chagrin of its
drafters? This Note aims to answer these questions by critically
analyzing the key features of the Protocol that may contribute to its
ineffectiveness and the instrument's potential for marginalizing
women in the future.
Part II details the interaction between the various African
instruments and bodies as related to the Protocol. This section
assesses why international instruments like the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW) and the Banjul
Charter were found to be ineffectual and why the Protocol was viewed
as a necessary addition to the growing body of international human
rights law. Part II briefly outlines the development of the Protocol to
its current status in Africa and the international community. Part III
analyzes the basic weaknesses of the Protocol-first by looking at the
actual language of several articles and then by exploring the
problems it has encountered in the course of implementation.
Applying a framework that draws from statutory, customary, and
living law framework, Part III explains how the Protocol not only
leaves women vulnerable to continued marginalization but also how

This concept is explained further later in the text. See infra notes 183-88
13.
and accompanying text.
14.
See, e.g., Shirley Randell, Report from Rwanda: Rebuilding in the Wake of
Catastrophe, MAZI: THE COMMUNICATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE REPORT, Nov. 2008,

("Rwanda is
http://www.communicationforsocialchange.org/mazi-articles.php?id=388
the first African country to meet the 50 percent quota as stipulated in the African
Union's Protocol to the African Charteron Human and People's Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa.")
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it may enable a new, more permanent form of de jure discrimination.
Finally, Part IV proposes possible solutions to prevent the Protocol
from fading into history as a futile effort to protect women or worsefrom becoming a tool of inequity.
These solutions range from
redrafting local laws to be gender-neutral to taking a more grassroots approach of first surveying people and then implementing
necessary changes to the law and custom.

II.

THE EMPEROR'S OLD WARDROBE: THE PROTOCOL AND ITS
ENTOURAGE

The Protocol must rely upon and interact with various
international African bodies and documents. It is important to know
who developed it, why it was developed, and in what context it is
interpreted and enforced. Understanding the relationship between
these bodies and the Protocol will better explain why the Protocol as
designed is so ill-fated.
A. The African Union
The African Union (AU) is a supranational organization
consisting of fifty-three African states. 15 Established in 2001 under
the Constitutive Act, the AU was formed as a successor to the
amalgamated African Economic Community (AEC) and the
Organization of African Unity (OAU). 16 The purpose of the AU is to
help secure African democracy, human rights, and a sustainable
economy-largely by bringing an end to intra-African conflict. 17 The
AU is the governing international body in Africa and the progenitor of
all Africa-specific international agreements since 2001.18
B. The African Charteron Human and Peoples'Rights
The Banjul Charter is an international human rights instrument
developed for the purposes of promoting and protecting human rights

15.
For a list of all member states, see African Union, Member States,
http://www.africa-union.org/rootlau/memberstates/map.htm
(last visited Mar. 25,
2009).
16.
Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, OAU Doc.
CABJLEG/23.15, available at http://www.africa-union.orglrootlau/AboutAU/ConstitutiveActen.htm [hereinafter Constitutive Act].
17.
See generally 1 AFRICAN UNION COMM'N, STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE AFRICAN
UNION COMMISSION: VISION AND MISSION OF THE AFRICAN UNION (2004), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/aulAboutAulVisionVolumel.pdf.
18.
See African Union, List of Treaties, Conventions, Protocols, Charters,
http://www.africa-union.org/root/aulDocuments/Treaties/treaties.htm (last visited Mar.
25, 2009) (cataloguing diplomatic agreements of the African Union).
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in Africa. 19 In 1979, under the auspices of the OAU, the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government adopted a decision calling for the
creation of a committee of experts to draft an African human rights
charter. 20 Similar to those that already existed in Europe and the
Americas, the Banjul Charter sought to address human rights from a
more Afrocentric perspective. 21 The Banjul Charter came into effect
on October 21, 1986.22 The African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, now seated in Banjul, Gambia, oversees and
interprets the Charter. 23 Although the Banjul Charter was designed
to guarantee the rights of both men and women, 24 women's rights are
only mentioned explicitly in one article. 25 For this reason and others,
there was a perceived need for a protocol to the Banjul Charter which
26
specifically dealt with women's rights.
C. The African Commission on Human and Peoples'Rights
and the African Court on Human and Peoples'Rights
The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the
Commission) is a quasi-judicial body established under the Banjul
Charter. 27
The Commission, vested with the responsibility of
monitoring compliance with the Banjul Charter, began its work in
1987.28 With one of the broadest mandates for a regional human
rights organization, the Commission has three areas of responsibility:
promoting human and peoples' rights, protecting these rights, and

19.
FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES'
RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 432 (2003); see WHO, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AFRICAN
CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 1, http://www.who.intfhhr/Human-and_

Peoples-rights.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) [hereinafter WHO REPORT].
20.
Curtis F.J. Doebbler, Complex Ambiguity: The Relationship Between the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and Other African Union
Initiatives Affecting Respect for Human Rights, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
7, 10-11 (2003).

21.
Id. at 11.
22.
See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
23.
Banjul Charter, supra note 3, art. 45; African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, History, http://www.achpr.org/english/-infofhistory-en.html
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2009); African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Mandate,
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/mandateen.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
24.
Banjul Charter, supra note 3, arts. 2-3.
25.
Id. art. 18(3).
26.
Fareda Banda, Blazing a Trail: The African Protocol on Women's Rights
Comes into Force, 50 J. AFR. L. 72, 72 (2006); Martin Semalulu Nsibirwa, A Brief
Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charteron Human and Peoples' Rights on
the Rights of Women, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 40, 41 (2001).
27.
Banjul Charter, supra note 3, arts. 30-31, 41.
28.

Id.
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to the
interpreting the Banjul Charter. 29 The Commission 3reports
0
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU.
A protocol to the Banjul Charter adopted in 1998 created the
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court). 31 The
African Court, established in 2006, supplemented the work of the
Commission. 32 It is a regional court that has jurisdiction over AU
states' compliance with the Banjul Charter. 33 The court is in the
process of merging with the African Court of Justice following a
decision by member states at a June 2004 AU Summit. 34 Until the
African Court begins to hear cases, the Commission interprets and
session, it
adjudicates the Protocol, but once the African Court is in
35
will assume the duties of interpretation and enforcement.
D. Other InternationalHuman Rights Instruments
While the context provided by the Banjul Charter primarily
governs the Protocol's interpretation, other international instruments
also inform its reading. 36 Knowledge of these other treaties is
important not only because of the additional obligations they may
impose but also because the Protocol was, in many ways, a response
to the perceived ineffectiveness or incompleteness of these
documents. 37 Instruments that existed before the Banjul Charter
and the Protocol fall into two categories: soft law (non-legally-binding

29.
Id. art. 45; see Doebbler, supra note 20, at 12. In pursuit of these goals, the
Commission is mandated to "collect documents, undertake studies and researches on
African problems in the field of human and peoples' rights, organize seminars,
symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local
institutions concerned with human and peoples' rights and, should the case arise, give
its views or make recommendations to Governments." Banjul Charter, supra note 3,
art. 45.
Banjul Charter, supra note 3, arts. 53-54.
30.
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
31.
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU
Doc. No. OAU/LEG/EXPIAFCHPR[PROT (III), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu
humanrts/africa/courtprotocol2004.html [hereinafter African Court Protocol].
Id. arts. 1-2.
32.
33.
Id. art. 3. See generally African International Courts and Tribunals, The
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts-conti
achpr/achpr-home.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (providing a background on the
creation of the court, its purpose and its predecessors).
34.
See African International Courts and Tribunals, The African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights, http://www.aict.ctia.org/courts-conti/achpr/achpr_
home.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 27, 32.
35.
Id. pmbl.; African Court Protocol, supra note 31, art. 7.
36.
37.
African Court Protocol, supra note 31, art. 7; Banda, supra note 26, at 27;
African International Courts and Tribunals, supra note 34; see also Rachel Murray,
InternationalHuman Rights: Neglect of Perspectives from African Institutions, 55 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 193, 202-03 (2006) (discussing the explicit provisions in the Protocol that
were not covered by previous human rights instruments).
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or aspirational) and hard law (legally binding). 38 Generally, these
instruments include the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, 39 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966,40 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
42
(ICESCR) of 1966,41 and CEDAW.
Hard law instruments generally refer to treaties or international
agreements that create legally binding obligations for the States
Parties. 4 3 Treaties like the ICCPR, CEDAW, and the Banjul Charter
impose affirmative duties, requiring the enforcement of their
provisions. 44 Soft law instruments, on the other hand, are quasi-legal
agreements that are only "potentially [legally] binding. '45 Although
not generally regarded as binding, soft law instruments may have
"strong moral force and are ... respected, particularly those in which
a great majority of States participated in their making. ''46 Some
treaties, like the UDHR and ICESCR are designed to be hard law
instruments but, due to their more aspirational provisions, are
regarded as soft law by parts of the international community. 47 In
order to understand the necessity of the Protocol, it is important to
"know why the pre-existing instruments [containing hard or soft
law]

.

.

.

failed to achieve the [desired] standard of protection of

38.
Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, A New Dawn for African Women? Prospects of Africa's
Protocolon Women's Rights, 16 SRI LANKA J. INT'L L. 83, 97 (2004).
39.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
40.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), Annex, at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
41.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), Annex, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Dec. 16, 1966).
42.
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
of 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, Annex, at 194, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW].
43.
Ebeku, supranote 38, at 98.
44.
Id. at 98-99.
45.
ROBERTO ANDORNO, THE INVALUABLE ROLE OF SOFT LAW IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSAL NORMS IN BIOETHICS 1 (2007), http://www.unesco.de/
fileadmin/pdf/1507.de.pdf; Ebeku, supranote 38, at 107.
46.
Ebeku, supranote 38, at 107-08.
47.
See, e.g., Katherine Cox, The Inevitability of Nimble Fingers? Law,
Development, and Child Labor, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 115, 138 (1999) (referring to
the ICESCR as soft law); Jared M. Genser & Margaret K. Winterkorn-Meikle, The
Intersection of Politics and InternationalLaw: The United Nations Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention in Theory and Practice, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 687, 747
(2008) (referring to the UDHR as soft law).
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few of these documents addressed
women's rights. '48 To that end, 49
women outside the family context.
Specifically, the Banjul Charter and CEDAW are the most
relevant to the shape and interpretation of the Protocol, as the
50
Protocol responded primarily to the perceived deficiencies of each.
Many African legal instruments failed to address women's rights
entirely. 51 However, the Banjul Charter, created with human rights
in mind, mentions women only twice: Article 2 included sex in a broad
non-discrimination clause and Article 18(3) required states to
eliminate "every discrimination against women and also ensure the
protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in
international declarations and conventions."5 2 Because these articles
of the Banjul Charter guaranteed the rights of both men and women,
there must have been strong reasons to subsequently create a
women-specific protocol.5 3 In particular, NGOs and States Parties
alike realized that these instruments did not explicitly address
commonplace practices like female genital mutilation (FGM), forced
marriages, or lobolo (bride price) and, as a result, failed to protect
54
women from harm adequately.
CEDAW, which specifically aimed to protect women from
discrimination, similarly failed to meet the needs of women in the
African context. 55 CEDAW was diluted by reservations. 56 In total,

Ebeku, supra note 38, at 130.
48.
49.
See, e.g., Banjul Charter, supra note 3, art. 18; ICCPR, supra note 40, art.
23; UDHR, supranote 39, art. 16.
50.
Protocol, supra note 4, pmbl.; Banda, supranote 26, at 72.
51.
Rachel Murray, Women's Rights and the Organizationof African Unity and
African Union: The Protocol on the Rights of Women, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN
FEMINIST APPROACHES 253, 253 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005); Rebouch6,
supra note 2, at 236. For instance, the foundational document of the OAU, the 1963
Charter of the Organization of African Unity, never references women or women's
rights. See generally Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 47
U.N.T.S. 39, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/OAUCharter_
1993.html.
52.
Banjul Charter, supra note 3, arts. 2, 18(3); Rebouch6, supra note 2, at 23637.
53.
Banjul Charter, supra note 3, art. 2; Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 40.
54.
Rebouch6, supra note 2, at 238 ("The African Charter [as the] sole juridical
instrument at the regional level in charge of promotion and protection of human rights
does not offer enough [ ] specific guarantees as regards women's rights in Africa."
(quoting Murray, supranote 51, at 263)).
55.
See generally CEDAW, supra note 42.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) defines a
56.
reservation as a unilateral statement made by a state "whereby it purports to exclude
or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that
State." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(d), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. For the most current list of reservations taken to
CEDAW, see CEDAW, 14th mtg., Provisional Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (2006), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/8269846.html
[hereinafter CEDAW Reservations].
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twenty-five States Parties made a total of sixty-eight substantive
reservations. 57 To date, it is one of the most heavily reserved of all
Although these
international human rights instruments. 58
reservations technically do not undermine the object and purpose of
the treaty, 59 the numerous reservations based on Islamic law and
contravening domestic law make it impossible for the women's rights
movement to catalyze a coherent realization of women's rights in all
countries.
E. The Development of the Protocol
Despite the adoption of many legal instruments at the
international level, particularly CEDAW and the Banjul Charter,
"African
more was needed to protect women's rights.6 0
States ... realised that human rights instruments at the
international level do not always address the unique problems of the
continent. Africa has at times had to supplement the protection
mechanisms at the international level so that they meet the needs of
its own unique conditions."6 1 Although African countries have
participated in the drafting of international rights instruments, 62 the
continent has been excluded largely from "norm-making within the
international framework . . . [as] African perspectives are either
'63
denigrated or ignored.
The Commission thus recognized the need for an Afrocentric,
women-specific document. 64 Working together with Women in Law
and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), the Commission organized a
The Commission concluded
seminar on women's rights in 1995.65
should be drafted to
Charter
to
the
that an additional protocol
66
OAU
Assembly of Heads
In July 1995, the
address women's rights.
of a protocol to the
on
the
necessity
of State and Government agreed
67
with
African NGOs,
Appointed experts, working together
Charter.

See CEDAW Reservations, supra note 56, at 6.
57.
Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
58.
Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 644 (1990).
59.
See VCLT, supra note 56, art. 18.
60.
Ebeku, supranote 38, at 84; Darnace Torou, The Struggle Towards Human
Rights in Africa: Success or Failure? pt. IV (Nov. 2001), http:www.peace.ca/afstruggle
humanrights.htm.
Nsibirwa, supranote 26, at 40.
61.
62.
James C.N. Paul, Participatory Approaches to Human Rights in SubSaharan Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 213,
216 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990).
Fareda Banda, Sex Gender and InternationalLaw, 100 AM. SOC'Y INVL L.
63.
PROC. 243, 243 (2006) (referring to studies done by Rachel Murray).
Protocol, supra note 4, pmbl.
64.
Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 41.
65.
Id.
66.
67.
Id.
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drafted the protocol. 68 In 1998, the Commission approved the Draft
Protocol to the Charter (Kigali Draft) and sent it to the OAU for
69
further action.
While the Kigali Draft was being produced, other developments
in the area of women's rights were underway, as the Inter-African
Committee on Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of
Women and Children (IAC) and the Women's Unit of the OAU
together developed the Draft OAU Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Harmful Practices Affecting the Fundamental Human
Rights of Women and Girls (OAU Draft). 70 ."In order to avoid
duplication, the OAU suggested that there should be closer
collaboration between the African Commission and the Women's
Unit. ' 71 The Women's Unit, together with the Legal Division of the
OAU, made suggestions to improve the Kigali Draft. 72 OAU Legal
Counsel suggested that government experts should convene to further
discuss the instrument before the OAU forwarded it to the Council of
73
Ministers and the Summit of Heads of State and Government.
In September 2000, an "integrated" draft was complete. 74 The
final draft of the Protocol was a more thorough document than the
Kigali Draft or the OAU Draft and addressed the concerns raised in
both. 75 Many thought that the protections guaranteed to women in
the Protocol went further than CEDAW or any other international
human rights instrument. 76 Then the waiting period began, as
governments needed time to study the document. 77 Moreover, the
Protocol also needed to be presented to the OAU. 78 On July 11, 2003,
at the second ordinary summit in Maputo, Mozambique, the African
heads of state and government adopted the Protocol. 79 However, in
April 2004, after eight years of drafting, negotiating, and promoting
the Protocol, only one country, the Comoros, had ratified it-nearly

68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 41-42; see African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 26th
Ord. Sess., Nov. 1-15, 1999, Final Communique, 16 (Nov. 15, 1999), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/achpr26f.html.
70.
Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 42.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
See Protocol, supra note 4. For strategic and substantive reasons, the Draft
OAU Convention was integrated into the Draft Kigali Protocol. Nsibirwa, supra note
26, at 42.
75.
Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 42. OAU had 27 articles (although final draft
has 32 articles); Kigali Draft had 23 and OAU Draft had 13 articles. Protocol, supra
note 4; Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 42 n.18.
76.
See, e.g., Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 42.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Faiza Jama Mohamed, African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa: The SOA WR Campaign,in BREATHING LIFE, supra note 4, at 14-15.
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one year after the instrument's adoption.80 In an effort to increase
Rights
support, the coalition Solidarity for African Women's
8
'
Protocol.
the
of
adoption
encourage
to
formed
was
(SOAWR)
The Protocol's entry into force in November 2005 occasioned
celebration. 8 2 The Protocol was viewed as not "merely advancing the
rights of women, but rather as advancing the interests of society in
general," on the grounds that the whole of society could gain from a
healthy and sustainable environment through the Protocol.8 3 The
Centre for Reproductive Rights described it as a landmark
instrument.8 4 Amnesty International referred to it as "a significant
step in the efforts to promote and ensure respect for the rights of
African women."8 5 Despite the international accolades, the final
document was considered more "cautious" than the predecessor

80.
Id.
Id. at 15-16. As of March 2006, 20 organizations are active in SOAWR.
81.
Members of SOAWR include: African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
(ACDHRS), African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET),
Akina Mama Wa Afrika, Association des Juristes Maliennes (AJM), Cellule de
Coordination sur les Pratiques Traditionelles Affectant la Santa des Femmes et des
Enfants (CPTAFE), Coalition on Violence Against Women (COVAW), Equality Now,
FAHAMU, Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA-Kenya), Foundation for Community
Development (FDC), Human Rights Law Service (HURILAWS), Inter-African Network
for Women, Media, Gender and Development (FAMEDEV), Inter African Committee on
Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children (IAC), OXFAM GB,
Sister Namibia, Union Nationale des Femmes de Djibouti (UNFD), University of
Pretoria Centre for Human Rights, Voix des Femmes, Women's Rights Advancement
and Protection Alternatives (WRAPA), and Women in Law and Development in Africa
(WiLDAF). Id. at 16 n.. SOAWR made use of multiple forms of communication, in
addition to the traditional media, for its Protocol publicity campaign, including
electronic newsletters, mobile phone text messages, and radio campaigns. Id. at 16-17.
Other methods included an AU session on gender, "held during the opening of the third
ordinary summit of the heads of state in July 2004," and the "Solemn Declaration on
Gender Equality in Africa, whereby heads of state and government declared that they
would ratify the Protocol by the end of 2004." Id. at 16-17. SOAWR also used the UN
review of the Commission on the Status of Women in March 2005 (regarding progress
made ten years after the Fourth World Conference on Women-Beijing 1995) as
another opportunity for advocacy. Id.
Togo was the fifteenth ratification on October 26, 2005. Rebouch6, supra
82.
note 2, at 235. The Protocol entered into force 30 days after its fifteenth ratification.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 29(1).
Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 49.
83.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 85; see Rumbi Mabuwa, Africa's New Protocol for
84.
Women's Rights: An Agenda for Action, REPROD. FREEDOM NEWS (Ctr. for Reprod. Rts.,
New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2003, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20071007203950/
http://www.reproductiverights.org/rfn 03_09_2.html#2 (praising the Protocol's "broad
protections for women's human rights").
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 85; Press Release, Amnesty International, African
85.
Union: Adoption of the Protocol on the Rights of Women-Positive Steps Toward
Combating Discrimination and Violence Against Women (July 21, 2003), available at
720 03
en.html.
http://www.amnesty.orgen/library/asset/AFRO/007/2003/en/dom-AFR0100
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drafts, possibly in order to "appeal to a wider African audience. '8 6 Of
course, this wider appeal meant the dilution of certain provisions,
causing some to feel the new language may not have been as strong
as necessary.8 7 Today, twenty-three years after it was initially
conceived, with the African Court on the cusp of hearing its first case,
the Protocol faces problems not only in ratification but also in the
88
implementation of its provisions.

III.

FULLY CLOTHED OR STILL NAKED: WHAT THE PROTOCOL
FAILS TO COVER

The AU, in adopting a treaty specifically concerning women,
intended to reinforce the "message that women's rights require
priority attention in the protection of universal and inalienable
rights. '8 9 Some provisions, such as those addressing affirmative
action, divorce, and inheritance rights, were already part of the laws
of a few African countries. 90 Other provisions had never before been
articulated in any international or regional human or women's rights
instrument. For instance, the Protocol is the first international
human rights instrument to affirm a woman's right to seek an
abortion, "albeit limited to cases of rape, incest, or a threat to the
mother's or fetus' health." 91
However, the Protocol faces obstacles beyond a lengthy drafting
period. 92 There are four broad issues that may dampen, if not
frustrate, the goals of the Protocol. First, a protocol solely focused on

86.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 126 n.115. Even so, there are certain countries
that still have not signed. See BREATHING LIFE, supra note 4, app. 3.
87.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 126 n.115.
88.
See generally GEORGE MUKUNDI WACHIRA, AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES' RIGHTS: TEN

YEARS ON AND

STILL No JUSTICE

(2008), available at

http://www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=537
(discussing
the
lack
of
implementation of the Protocol and the resulting detrimental effect on justice).
89.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 83 (quoting the U.N. High Commissioner of
Human Rights in a speech made on July 14, 2003).
90.
For examples of laws and constitutions that embrace provisions, see the
laws of Botswana, Kenya, Uganda and South Africa to start. See, e.g., UGANDA CONST.
art. 33 (1995), available at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/constit/constitu/constit/uganda/
uganda-e.htm; Matrimonial Causes Act, (1941) Cap. § 8 (Kenya), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr-app/frames.php; Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (S.
Aft.).
91.
Banda, supra note 63, at 245; see Protocol, supranote 4, art. 14.
92.
Although the drafting, negotiation and adoption period was long
(approximately eight years), the ratification period was the shortest for any African
human rights instrument. The Banjul Charter took five years to come into force
(adopted in 1981, entered into force in 1986), the Protocol establishing the African
Court took six years after adoption (adopted in 1998, entered into force in 2004), and
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child took nine years to come into
force after it was adopted in 1990. Mohamed, supra note 79, at 15.
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women may encounter problems that will not become apparent until
much later. Making general human rights concerns specific to
women may put women in a protected class that could gradually
morph into a sheltered or stigmatized group. Moreover, the narrow
language of certain provisions may be too limited to actually protect
women from all the harmful practices the Protocol intends to
proscribe.
The second broad concern is that the Protocol provides little
guidance as to what form of law should govern the implementation,
interpretation, and application of the articles within the domestic
courts of the States Parties.
That is, the Protocol draws no
93
distinctions between statutory law, customary law, or living law.
This is particularly relevant because the application of one form of
law over another could dramatically alter the result for the affected
94
parties.
The third, and perhaps most basic, concern is that using a
protocol rather than a stand-alone treaty or other instrument lacks
the force necessary for handling human rights issues. If ratification
and implementation of the Protocol fails, it sets a dangerous
precedent for the enumerated rights to be ignored not only in practice
but also, over time, in customary international law. Nevertheless,
the overriding concern is not when or if the Protocol will be
implemented, but how it will be implemented. Currently, there is a
disturbing trend in regard to the manner in which States Parties
have implemented some of the rights in the Protocol. 95 The women's
rights movement will be limited and harmed in the future by
practices including affirmative action and "quota-like" programs that
96
are in place in various countries.
A. Targeting Women and Africa-Specific Practices
Although the Protocol as written may not be the perfect solution,
97
it satisfied a clear need by explicitly addressing women's rights.

93.
See generally Protocol, supra note 4.
94.
For a more in depth discussion on the different types of law and their
potential effect on African citizens, see infra Part IJI.B.
95.
Irungu Houghton, Reviewing the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa,
PAMBAZUKA NEWS, May 24, 2006, available at http://www.newsfromafrica.org
newsfromafrica/articles/art_10688.html.
96.
Randell, supra note 14.
97.
Women were, and continue to be, politically, financially and socially
disadvantaged compared to their male counterparts. "[O]f the 1.9 million victims of
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, 63 per cent were women and children."
Karoline Kemp, General Situation of Women in Africa, in BREATHING LIFE, supra note
4, at 3, 3. According to the United Nations Development Programme, women's share of
parliamentary seats in sub-Saharan Africa was only 7.2 percent in 1990; in Northern
Africa, women's share was only 2.6 percent in 1990. Id. at 4. Statistics from UNAIDS
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However, many of the listed rights in the Protocol are ones that
should be guaranteed to all individuals-not just women.
For
instance, Articles 10 and 11 provide for the Right to Peace and the
Right to Protection in Armed Conflicts, respectively. 98 As written,
there is nothing inherently unique about women that necessitates
that a right be articulated solely for women, potentially at the
expense of men. In addition, to be sure, other international treaties
have guaranteed this right for all.99 "On the whole, it is clear that
the African Protocol on Women's Rights is squarely or largely in line
with pre-existing instruments on human rights generally and
women's rights in particular." 10 0
An instrument that explicitly
targets women does just that-it targets women.
Creating a
protected status for women both in time of peace and conflict may
effectively lead to the view that women are in need of protection. 1 1
Already stereotyped as the weaker, inferior sex, portraying women as
needing protection in this manner may reinforce this negative
image.' 0 2 In time, this status may limit the ability of women to
participate in other meaningful ways. Regardless, the need for
women's rights to be clearly articulated may outweigh the risk
associated with addressing women's rights in a separate document,
rather than solely within a general human rights document.
The level of specificity in the articles of the Protocol may also
hurt women. Certain provisions of the Protocol include exceptionally
detailed language.' 0 3 Under the canon of construction expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, it is understood that to express or include one
thing in the language of a document implies the exclusion of others
from coverage of the document or the reverse1 0 4 While it was
important to tackle harmful practices particular to Africa, by
including so much detail the Protocol may be interpreted to imply
that if a particular practice is not enumerated in the Protocol it is not
prohibited by the Protocol, even if it is harmful to women. For
example, Article 6 requires a minimum age for marriage, as many
conventions concerning marriage have done in the past. 10 5 However,

show that in 2003, 23 million adults with HIV/AIDS were in sub-Saharan Africa-57
percent were female. Id. at 7.
98.
Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 10-11.
99.
See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1; UDHR, supra note 39, pmbl., art. 3.
100.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 129.
101.
See infra Part IV.
102.

See, e.g., VALENTINE M. MOGHADAM, MODERNIZING WOMEN: GENDER AND

SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 171 (2003) (quoting Al Watan, an Algerian
newspaper, referring to women as the "so-called weaker sex" in the newspaper's
coverage of a 1994 women's rights protest in Algeria).
103.
See, e.g., Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 6, 12-14.
104.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
105.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6. See, for example, Convention on Consent to
Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration for Marriage, G.A. Res. 1763A,
Annex, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1167th plen. mtg. (Nov. 7, 1962), available at
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the Protocol actually sets the minimum age at eighteen, unlike other
10 6
instruments that have left it to the discretion of the States Parties.
10 7
Two States Parties, Tunisia and Sudan, objected to this provision.
For Tunisia, the objection is in keeping with its Personal Status Code
1956 as amended, which sets the minimum age of marriage at
seventeen for consenting females and twenty for males.' 0 8 In both
countries, marriage before either age is permitted with the consent of
both parents. 10 9 However, the Protocol does not expressly allow for
States Parties to deviate from its minimum age of eighteen, perhaps
excluding the possibility of setting a different minimum age, despite
Tunisia and Sudan's objections. In another example, the Protocol
does not explicitly prohibit the practices of lobolo (bride price) or
leviratic marriages (the practice of inheriting a wife). While the
Protocol does require that "no marriage shall take place without the
free and full consent of both parties," the failure to explicitly address
the practices may be interpreted as allowing them to continue.11 0
Other African countries have wholly ignored the Protocol because
these types of provisions interfere with customary practices and
religious law. 1 1 ' In this way, the over-specificity of an article may
alienate a country from signing the Protocol entirely, leaving women
unprotected in the state. In another example, Article 6 also requires
marriages to be recorded in writing." 2 This directly conflicts with
3
many African customs that do not rely on written documentation."
As a result, some States Parties may choose not to follow this part of
the Protocol either, which interferes with its potential for effective
implementation.

http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3fb/63.htm, which required States Parties to set a
minimum age for marriage.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6; see, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
106.
Child art. 1, G.A. Res 44/25, Annex, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) (setting
the age of a child as 18 but allows States Parties to set a different age).
107.
Freedom House, Tunisia, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=
184 (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
Id.
108.
109.
Id.
110.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6.
111.
For instance, Niger, a country with one of the highest child marriage rates
and a largely Muslim country, refused to sign the Protocol in June 2006. See Niger MPs
Reject Protocol on Women's Rights, INDEPENDENT ONLINE, June 6, 2006,
http://www.iol.co.zalindex.php?set id=1&clickid=86&art id=qwl149543182315B216
[hereinafter Niger MPs]; see also United Nations Population Fund, State of the World's
Population 2005, Child Marriage Fact Sheet, http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/presskitl
factsheets/factschild_marriage.htm (noting that, in Niger, 76 percent of girls ages 1519 are married).
112.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6.
113.
Edward Kofi Quashigah & Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Legitimate Governance
in Africa-International and Domestic Legal Perspectives: An Introduction, in
LEGITIMATE

GOVERNANCE

IN

AFRICA:

INTERNATIONAL

AND

DOMESTIC

LEGAL

PERSPECTIVES 3, 9 (Edward Kofi Quashigah & Obiora Chinedu Okafor eds., 1999).
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When crafting an international instrument, drafters should
generally avoid being so specific that they effectively prevent an
instrument from meeting future needs. Furthermore, States Parties
may want to implement obligations in different ways. For example,
States Parties may have different needs based on economic or
cultural makeup. A narrowly written provision binds the States
Parties to particular courses of action that may not be the most
appropriate or beneficial for their citizens. The Protocol risks overspecificity in multiple articles. 114 As will be discussed later, these
narrow provisions will limit the effective implementation of some
rights. 115
B. Which Law Governs Implementation?
Article 26 of the Protocol calls upon States Parties to "ensure the
implementation of this Protocol at the national level" and to indicate
in periodic reports "legislative and other measures undertaken for the
full realization of the rights herein recognized.""16 States Parties
have an affirmative obligation to "undertake all necessary measures
and in particular [to] provide budgetary and other resources for the
full and effective implementation of the rights. 11 7 Further, they are
required to harmonize the obligations of the Protocol with their
domestic law obligations."l 8 By incorporating these principles into
domestic law, the States Parties are able to enforce the provisions in
their own country. 119
Notwithstanding the narrow manner in which the text of certain
Protocol articles is drafted, the overarching vagueness in some
articles on how these goals should be implemented creates additional
problems. 120 Although the broad leeway granted to the States Parties

114.
Other articles that are notably too narrow or overly specific include: Article
11: Women in Armed Conflict; Article 12: Education (requiring the elimination of all
stereotypes in textbooks, syllabuses and media-a task that has yet to be accomplished
in most countries); Article 14: Health and Reproductive Rights (offering not only access
to any form of contraception but also requiring States Parties to establish pre-natal
and post-natal nutritional services for women); Article 15: Right to Food Security
(requires access to sources of domestic fuel); Articles 8 and 9: Political and Legal
Participation (requiring affirmative action plans be instituted). Protocol, supra note 4,
arts. 8-9, 11-12, 14-15.
115.
See infra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of Protocol articles 8 and 9.
116.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 26(1).
117.
Id. art. 26(2).
118.
Ibrahima Kane, Harmonising the Protocol with National Legal Systems, in
BREATHING LIFE, supra note 4, at 51-52.
119.
Id. at 53. In an example where domestication of an international treaty
obligation did not occur, the Senegalese criminal courts were originally unable to apply
the Convention Against Torture in the trial of the Chadian dictator Hissan Habre
because it had not harmonized its legislation. Id.
120.
See, e.g., Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 4, 8, 13 17; see also id. arts. 25-26
(regarding the form of remedies and their implementation).
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in how to implement the Protocol may appear desirable, in this
particular context greater specificity is desirable, as more guidance
would ensure that all of the States Parties enact at least the same
minimum protections. The need for more guidance is partly informed
by the fact that the States Parties legal systems are as diverse as the
continent itself. Many countries are democracies, but some operate
under communist governments. 12 1 While many countries have a set
constitution, others are governed by customary law based on tribal
and traditional practices. 122 Many operate under a system that is an
amalgamation of the two, giving deference to customary law either
through the legislature or in practice. 123 However, some suggest that
the states should not be governed by statutory or customary law but
instead by 'living law," or the law as it is written, traditionally
124
exercised, and currently practiced.
Understanding this interplay between statutory law, customary
law, and living law is necessary for determining the most effective
way to provide for the guarantees of the Protocol. If the Protocol is to
assist women, it is important to know where, how, and why they need
help, from a legal perspective. However, "there is abundant evidence
to indicate that the problem [for women] does not lie in paucity or
defects in the pre-existing laws. Rather, the problem may be located
in the conflict between custom [or] tradition and the contemporary
ideas of women's rights as well as the failure in implementation of
'125
the laws by the appropriate authorities.
1.

Statutory Law

In the African context, statutory law is analogous to
constitutionalism, or the limitation of government and separation of
powers by laws embodied in a written constitution. 126 This emphasis
on the written embodiment and codification of the laws of the
community is closely linked to Africa's colonial past. 127 Although

121.
See generally SAUL BERNARD COHEN, GEOPOLITICS OF THE WORLD SYSTEM
77-79 (2002) (describing the role of communism in sub-Saharan Africa). Angola, Benin,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Mozambique all
currently are or have had communist governments. Id.
Jill Zimmerman, The Reconstitution of Customary Law in South Africa:
122.
Method and Discourse, 17 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 197, 212 (2001).
Id. at 213
123.
Id.
124.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 130.
125.
See RICHARD WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN
126.
SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE 1 n.1 (2001) (offering Jan-

Erik Lane's definition of constitutionalism).
127.
See generally Fareda Banda, Women, Law and Human Rights in Southern
Africa, 32 J. S. AFR. STUD. 13, 14 (2006) ("Regardless of the colonial experience and the
manner of its conclusion, the common theme in all of these [postcolonial African]
countries is that postcolonial legal systems are plural. This means they recognize
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Africa had societal structures for governance and rules in place in its
128
pre-colonial epoch, colonialism had a unique impact on these rules.
"With colonialism, African law ceased to be endogenously
developed ... by Africans or . . . for Africans. It no longer evolved
according to African needs. Thenceforth, the power to make laws, or
sanction those that existed before, passed to the colonialists."'1 29 This
transfer of power resulted in a "deculturalization" of the law at the
same time the continent was "injected with the capitalist mode of
production.' 130 Like many of the norms within international human
rights law, constitutionalism is intrinsically linked to a "Western"
ideology and to colonialism.' 3' For this reason, many countries are
132
hesitant to adopt certain human rights instruments.
The language of Article 26 implicates statutory law as a means
for ensuring that States Parties domesticate the goals of the
Protocol. 133 It requires that States Parties include the Protocol's
provisions in their constitutions and report on legislative and other
measures taken. 134 This explicit reference to the legislature is
logical; the Protocol itself is a form of statutory law and thus relies on
other forms of statutory law to carry out its objectives. However,
beyond the requirements of Article 26, the Protocol does not address
the function of statutory law. 13 5 There is no discussion of whether
statutory law should supersede customary laws or practices. 136 It is
understood from the object and purpose of the Protocol that any
customary practice that discriminates against or harms women will
be prohibited entirely, 137 but, depending on the situation, this can be
misleading.
Article 31 also creates confusion. It states that "none of the
provisions of the present Protocol shall affect more favorable
provisions for the realization of the rights of women contained in the
national legislation of States Parties or in any other regional,

general law (statute law), usually based on the law of the colonizing state .
also Quashigah & Okafor, supra note 113, at 9.
128.

); see

OsITA C. EZE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: SOME SELECTED PROBLEMS 14

(1984).
129.

130.
131.

Id.

Id. at 14-15.
* Anthony Anghie,

International Law, in

Universality and the Concept of Governance in

LEGITIMATE

GOVERNANCE

IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL AND

DOMESTIC LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 113, at 21, 21-22. See generally Virginia A.
Leary, The Effect of Western Perspectives on International Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 62, at 15.
132.
LONE LINDHOLT, QUESTIONING THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA, MALAWI AND
MOZAMBIQUE 12 (1997).

133.

Protocol, supra note 4, art. 26.

134.

Id.

135.

See generally Protocol, supra note 4.

136.
137.

Id.
Id.
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continental or international conventions, treaties or agreements
applicable in these States Parties. '138 Although clear on its face, this
poses a problem for countries that contain statutory hierarchies of
139
law that place customary law on equal footing with statutory law.
In fact, "most African countries have one commonality: a dual or
plural legal system, namely, a customary/religious system and a
general/statutory system." 140 In countries like South Africa, "debate
has centered on the constitutional recognition of both a right to
culture and a right to substantive gender equality. ' 141 The conflict
between the cultural and statutory law dichotomy is embodied in
concerning
cases like Mthembu v. Letsela, a South African case
14 2
gender discrimination and the inheritance of property.
2.

Customary Law

Customary law, like customary international law, is based on
143
It
generally accepted practices developed over a period of time.

138.
Id. art. 31.
139.
For example, Zimbabwe allows for customary law to be considered and
treated on the same level as statutory law if the topic has also been addressed and/or
codified by statutory law. Otto Saki & Tatenda Chiware, The Law in Zimbabwe,
GLOBALEX, Feb. 2007, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/zimbabwe.htm#-CustomaryLaw.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 86.
140,
Zimmerman, supra note 122, at 198 (citing Thandabantu Nhlapo, Cultural
141.
Diversity, Human Rights and the Family in Contemporary Africa: Lessons From the
South African Constitutional Debate, 9 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 208 (1995) (looking at the
current South African debate pitting ideas of cultural relativism against gender
equality)).
142.
In Mthembu, a conflict existed between a daughter's right to inherit her
deceased father's land under the statutory law and the customary practice of
primogeniture which would have required the land to be bequeathed to a male relative.
Mthembu v. Letsela 1997 (2) SA 936 (T.P.D.) at 937-39 (S. Mr.). The Mthembu
decision, rendered in a subsequent trial court opinion after a remission to determine
material facts, see id. at 947, has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
South Africa. See Mthembu v. Letsela 1998 (2) SA 675 (T.P.D.) at 688 (S. Afr.) (trial
court opinion); Mthembu v. Letsela 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA) at 885 (S. Mr.) (appellate
affirmation). It remains to be seen whether it will be appealed to the Constitutional
Court.
143.
Under the International Court of Justice Statute Article 38(1)(b), "a general
practice accepted as law" is an international custom. Although similar to customary
international law in how it is developed over time, in this context, customary
international law means something entirely different. The Restatement Third § 102(2)
provides an insightful definition of customary international law as "[resulting] from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §102(2). (1987). Hence,

a rule or principle, reflected in the practice or conduct of states, must be accepted by
them, expressly or tacitly, as being legally binding on the international plane in order
to be considered a rule of international law. (In the case of the Protocol, however,
ignoring the legally binding obligations could be indicative that the States Parties do
not believe certain duties are required.) Customary law, on the other hand, refers to
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includes rules and norms that are based on cultural traditions, often
related to tribal, ethnic, or otherwise rural practices. 144 Customary
law is often seen as being in conflict with statutory law. 145 "The
argument that traditional societies did not possess a legal system was
based either on inadequate information or lack of appreciation for the
true nature of pre-colonial African societies. It was also based on
'146
Western scholars' concept of law as that emanating from the state.
Certainly,
[tihere is a distinction to be made between custom and law, and it is
true that not all custom has the form, and therefore the force, of law,
but . . . [w]hat is important is whether the overall trends of society'
including custom as well as law, reflect some of the same concepts and structures ... and whether they were perceived by the people to have a
147
binding force of some kind.

As first articulated by Francisco de Vitoria in De Indis, a 16th
century text, the ability to reason binds all people to a universal
natural law, or jus gentium.148 Presented within this framework, the
applicability of universal norms historically has had a dual effect on
customary practices: "on the one hand, it provides ... a status under
the law; on the other, the failure .. .to comply with these 'universal
standards' means that they [Africans and customary law] may be
1 49
subject to the sanctions which follow such violations."'
The natural law theory is closely related to the universalist
feminist view, which is a predominant position in Western legal
science. 150
Universalist feminism reconciles conflicts between

the time-honored traditions and tribal practices that are developed in the different
cultures, tribes, and enclaves in Africa.
144.
See Banda, supra note 127, at 13-14 (broadly discussing the development of
the plural legal systems in postcolonial Africa as a result of the "Indirect Rule" adopted
by colonizers that allowed the "Africans ...to practice their traditions").
In such communities, law is not the act of a sovereign, whether an individual or
a body of men: it is the traditional rule of the community; and it is enforced,
not by a sanction prescribed ad hoc by the sovereign, but one that is involved in
the beliefs and practices of the community.
T.O. ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 48 (1956) (internal citation
omitted).
145.
See Zimmerman, supra note 122, at 198 ("Underlying this construction
[women's rights vs. right to culture], is the assumption of a simple dichotomy between
African cultural rights and (western) women's rights.").
146. EZE, supra note 128, at 10.
147.
LINDHOLT, supranote 132, at 12.
148.

Anghie, supra note 131, at 23-24 (citing FRANCISCUS DE VITORIA, DE INDIS

ET IVRE BELLI RELECTIONE (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie
Institute of Washington 1917) (1557)).
149.

Id.

150.
Anne Hellum, Human Rights and Gender Relations in PostcolonialAfrica:
Options and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 635,
649-51 (2000). The universalist feminist position is often defined in contrast to cultural
relativism. See, e.g., id. at 649; see also Fareda Banda, Global Standards:Local Values,
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international, national, and customary law through the belief in "the
existence of overriding norms and values" that are common to all
people. 151 The universalist feminist position ensures "coherence and
harmony between different norms and values" by establishing a
hierarchical framework between these different sources of law,
thereby maintaining the general legitimacy of all while still creating
152
a unified, consistent theory.
While statutory law focuses on the obligations and privileges
created by the legislature and constitution, customary law represents
the traditions, rules, and culture that have evolved within the
community over time. 15 3 Statutory law has become synonymous with
not only Western ideologies, but also a top-down, dictatorial approach
to governance, whereas customary laws may be more acephalous or
54
communitarian.1
The Protocol generally addresses customary law in a negative
light, likely because it was crafted as a response to many traditional
practices that violate women's rights. 155 While certain practices are
specifically prohibited, others are understood to be forbidden based on
the broad language of the Protocol. 156 The Protocol expressly permits
other traditions. 157 The explicit prohibition of certain traditional

17 INT'L J.L. POLY & FAM. 1, 4 (2003) ("The contention of some universalists is that the
cultural relativist position is invoked by states which wish to circumvent the rights of
citizens.").
151.
Id. at 651.
152.
Id.
ELIAS, supranote 144, at 48.
153.
Hellum, supra note 150, at 651.
154.
155.
See Mary Wandia, Editorial, Rights of Women in Africa: Launch of a
Petition to the African Union, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (June 24, 2004), reprinted in
EDITORIALS FROM PAMBAZUKA NEWS 2004, at 95, 98 (Firoze Manji & Patrick Burnett
eds., 2005), available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/publications/africanvoices_
chap04.pdf.

Mainstream international human rights standards are defined in relation to
men's experience, and stated in terms of discrete violations of rights in the
public realm whereas most violations of women's human rights occur in
In most African countries, the same constitutional provisions that
private ....
guarantee gender equality allow exceptions in the so-called 'private law' areas
of customary law, personal law and family law. Serious violations of women's
human rights such as violence against women and provisions that discriminate
against them are found in that private sphere.
Id.
156.
One cultural practice that is specifically prohibited is female genital
mutilation (art. 14); some cultural practices assumed to be forbidden include lobolo
(art. 6), leviratic marriages (arts. 6 and 7), and primogeniture (arts. 20 and 21).
Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 6-7, 14, 20-21. However, see supra Part III.A as to why
the inference that these practices are prohibited may not be enough and there is the
possibility that the practices could be even allowed under the Protocol.
157.
Article 6: Marriage, permits polygamy despite the original rejection of the
traditional practice in the 2000 draft of the Protocol. Cf. Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6
("[M]onogamy is encouraged as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of
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practices is the reason why the Protocol's implementation and choice
of governing law is so important.
States Parties may opt for
reservations to certain articles in order to continue to allow
detrimental customs. Alternatively, States Parties may accept the
prohibitions in writing, but fail to enforce the provisions, or only
apply customary law to the issue when it is raised in court, which
may ultimately lead to the nullification of a right.
3.

Living Law

Currently, living law perhaps most accurately reflects the state
of flux most States Parties experience as they begin implementing
and enforcing rights under the Protocol. South African academics
refer to "living law" as the "law and custom as it is actually
understood and applied in contemporary communities."' 158
It is
argued that living law "more flexibly reflects recent social changes
that have broken down strictly hierarchical relations.' 1 59 As a blend
of statutory law, customary law, and developing social norms, experts
disagree as to whether the courts and States Parties ought to rely on
living law as the litmus test for addressing women's societal
conditions and needs. 160 "[I]f judicial recognition of living law is
undertaken as a codification of current social practice, the process
might do little more than give the force of law to status quo social
relationships.' 16 1 However, it also potentially affords women an
opportunity to contest prevailing cultural norms that disadvantage
them. This could provide the impetus for a more participatory
process of customary law assessment. Allowing women to voice their
beliefs rather than merely relying upon colonial documents or
patriarchal customs could enable States Parties to implement more
effective measures for assisting women.
The constitutions of many African states reflect "[t]he tense
relationship between values and principles such as religious freedom,
162
the protection of African custom and culture, and gender equality.'
It is also seen in court rooms, where cases like Mthembu have failed
to set a clear precedent but have provided a terrific insight into the

women in marriage and family, including in polygamous marital relationships are
promoted and protected.") (emphasis added), with Draft of Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa art. 7(c),
submitted Sept. 11, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 ("polygamy shall be prohibited").
158.
Zimmerman, supra note 122, at 213.
159.
Id.
160.
Id. at 213-14.
161.
Id. at 214.
162.
Hellum, supra note 150, at 636 (quoting Fareda Banda, Meaningless
Gestures?African Nations and the Convention on All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst
Women, in THE CHANGING FAMILY: FAMILY FORMS AND FAMILY LAW (John Eekelar. &
Thandabantu Nhlapo eds., 1998)).
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responsibility of the courts in determining whether statutory,
customary, or living law should be applied to legal cases concerning
cultural practices. 16 3 Appellate Judge Le Roux's decision in Mthembu
in particular, which favored applying customary law, "resembled less
of a balancing of rights than it did an assertion that the purpose
behind the right to gender equality could be fulfilled by full
recognition of official customary law."'1 64 When discussing what
would be considered gender discrimination concerning the practice of
primogeniture he wrote:
It is common cause that in rural areas where this rule most frequently
finds its application, the devolution of the deceased's property onto the
male heir involves a concomitant duty of support and protection of the
woman or women to whom he was married by customary law ....

This

view of the rule relating to succession has much to commend itself. If
one accepts the duty to provide sustenance, maintenance, shelter as a
necessary corollary of the system of primogeniture . . . I find it difficult
to equate this form of differentiation between men and women with the
165
concept of "unfair discrimination" as used in §8 of the Constitution.

Although Article 31 of the Protocol and general practice permit
the interpreting body to take into consideration other human rights
instruments, it does so with the understanding that those documents
must provide more favorable protection. 166 In the case of Mthembu,
Judge Le Roux relied on "outdated anthropological and romantic
Africanist idealizations"'16 7 that glossed over the "well-documented
disadvantages faced by women living in rural communities by
emphasizing theoretically protective and reciprocal elements of
African patriarchy.' 6 8 In Mthembu, the defendant was able to pit
the rights envisioned for women in the South African Constitution
against the South African constitutional recognition of a right to
culture. 16 9 Thus, the case was framed as a debate on constitutional
interpretation-a "tug-of-war between those who would claim a
constitutionally protected cultural right to lead their domestic lives

163.
See generally Mthembu v. Letsela 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA) (S. Afr.)
(discussing the intersection of fundamental rights guaranteed to women by the South
African constitution with customary practices favoring male ownership and succession
of property).
164.
Zimmerman, supra note 122, at 217-18.
165.
Id. (quoting Mthembu v. Letsela 1997 (2) SA 936 (T.P.D.) at 945 (S. Afr.)).
166.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 31; see Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 50 (referring
to Article 27 of the Draft Women's Protocol, which later became Article 31 of the
Protocol, Nsibirwa explained that "the body interpreting the Protocol will not be
limited to the Protocol but should establish the most favorable protection that can be
afforded to women ...
[by] taking into consideration other human rights instruments
and the domestic law which bind the state").
167.
Zimmerman, supra note 122 at 218.
168.
Id.
169.
Id. at 198 (recognizing the tension in South Africa between "the
constitutional recognition of both a right to culture and a right to substantive gender
equality").
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according to a relatively familiar customary law and those who
believe that any reform initiative must now give due consideration to
'170
the Bill of Rights and to South Africa's international obligations.
This "tug-of-war" epitomizes the struggle between statutory,
customary and living law-a struggle between the desire to more
broadly recognize the global perception of women's rights and the
need to preserve culture through traditions.
The Protocol calls upon statutory law, at a minimum, to be used
by the States Parties to implement the provisions of the Protocol
domestically.17 1 However, this does not bar customary law from
being presented as a defense to any claims in a court. Moreover,
many States Parties recognize customary law in their legal
systems.1 72 Botswana's constitution, for instance, "gives precedence
to custom over contemporary ideas of non-discrimination and gender
equality. '173 As a result, regardless of how the case is brought to the
courts, if the court or defendant can present a proper claim that
upholding customary law is indeed more favorable, the guaranteed
protections of the Protocol may be invalidated. Thus, the real
question in implementation may not be which type of law applies to
the creation of the law, but rather which type is applied in the
enforcement of the Protocol.
Despite the fact that the Protocol does not specifically address
the type of law that should be applied in the enforcement of the
Protocol's provisions, 1 74 the States Parties must give careful
consideration to how to craft the laws of implementation and
enforcement to ensure they will fulfill their obligations under the
Protocol. Otherwise, rights to culture may supplant women's right to
equality and freedom from marginalization. Indeed, many African
legal systems are reluctant to favor statutory law over customary law,
even in protecting women's rights, because of the historic connection
to colonialism and the current belief that it may promote Eurocentric
norms over African traditions. 75 Thus, as the women's rights
movement in Africa is increasingly associated with statutory law, it is

170.

Zimmerman, supra note 122, at 221 (citing S. AFR. L. COMM'N, THE

HARMONIZATION

OF THE

COMMON LAW AND THE INDIGENOUS LAW: REPORT

ON

CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES § 1.6.1 (1998), available at http://www.saflii.org.za/za/other/
zalclreport/19981411998_4.rtf [hereinafter MARRIAGE REPORT]).
171.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(b).
172.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 134 ("Like Zambia, the Constitution of Botswana
gives precedence to custom over contemporary ideas of non-discrimination and gender
equality.").
173.
Id.
174.

Id.

175.
See Zimmerman, supra note 122, at 222 (discussing how the perception of
"Western" values can be negative in the African women's rights context).
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and more
less likely to be considered beneficial to African culture
176
likely to be viewed as solely espousing Western theories.
C. When Implementation Does Not Occur
A failure to implement the provisions of the Protocol can occur in
three ways: (1) a country either does not sign or ratify the Protocol;
(2) a country ratifies the Protocol but fails to domesticate the
provisions in its laws; or (3) a country ratifies and domesticates but
fails to enforce the protections of the Protocol. The failure to sign,
ratify, domesticate, and enforce the provisions of the Protocol may
have a far-reaching and damaging effect on the women's rights
movement. That is, if enough countries either ignore a treaty or fail
to recognize its provisions in their general customs or state practice,
this can become evidence of a lack of opinio juris that the protections
enshrined in the Protocol are not legally binding. 177 As gender
equality has not yet risen to the level of a jus cogens norm, 178 there
exists a real possibility that the Protocol will be viewed more as a
"declaration" than as a legally enforceable instrument, if the Protocol
is poorly received or States Parties fail to implement the appropriate
laws. This would likely make future negotiations with non-States
Parties regarding women's rights less successful.
In international law, a protocol is an "addition to an already
existing treaty,"179 generally in the form of another treaty or
international agreement. A protocol can amend or add provisions to
its "parent" treaty.18 0 A protocol is only binding on the States Parties
who sign and ratify it, not all the States Parties to the earlier
agreement; it comes with its own set of newly developed rights and
obligations.18 1 To a large extent, protocols have become more of an
exercise in academia and theory, rather than a practical solution to

176.
Id.
Opinio juris is short for the Latin opinio juris sive necessitas or, a
177.
conviction that a rule is obligatory. An opinio juris is proven if it is (1) a practice that is
widely followed and (2) it is deemed by states to be obligatory as a matter of law.
Inaction can also be deemed a form of state practice. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1125
(8th ed. 2004).
178.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "jus cogens" as "[a]
mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognized
by the international community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted"). See
generally Ladan Askari, Girls' Rights Under International Law: An Argument for
Establishing Gender Equality as a Jus Cogens, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 3
(1998).
179.
Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 50.
180.

RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., AN EXPLANATORY GUIDE TO THE CARTAGENA

PROTOCOL ON
guidefront.pdf.
181.
Id.

BIOSAFETY

2

(2003),

available at

http://pdf.wri.orgfbiosafety_
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amending international law. 8 2 Framing expansive and far-reaching
policies in a protocol may indicate that either there was not enough
initial support for the ideas when the original treaty (e.g., the Banjul
Charter) was signed or they were not considered an issue at the time.
Because women's rights have been a long-standing concern in Africa,
it is more likely that insufficient support or consideration was
originally given to protecting women's rights in this comprehensive a
manner.
A country may fail to adopt the Protocol or falter in its
implementation for valid reasons; in some cases, the goals of the
Protocol are lofty and unrealistic for countries to commit to at this
point.18 3 For instance, the Protocol guarantees medical access and
legal aid services for women,' 8 4 luxuries that many countries struggle
to provide adequately to any citizen-male or female. Many countries
examine their hierarchy of needs in a manner that construes human
rights as an aspirational goal rather than a foundational practice. As
a result, ensuring security from attack (internal or external), stability
in governance, and a thriving economy, among other indicators, will
often come before recognizing a protocol that would impose burdens
85
cutting to the core of these basic needs.1
"National budgets provide the truest indication of state
priorities. The process of allocating scarce national resources reveals
a government's highest priorities and identifies its favored
constituents when decision makers must choose among policy
priorities.' 1 6
There simply may be budgetary restrictions on
properly implementing the Protocol, even if a country is already a
State Party. In addition to budgetary concerns, some countries'
leaders may be unaware of the Protocol's comprehensive nature or
may be generally apathetic or ambivalent to its goals, and so fail to

182.

Interview with Michael A. Newton, supranote 11.

183.

The Draft Women's Protocol may also be said to set out goals that are
difficult to attain, and for this reason it may not be ratified by some
countries as they may not be in a position to attain the goals it sets out
to achieve. The end result would be that the Protocol would become yet
another addition to the existing body of human rights instruments
meant rather for academic discourse than for practical enforcement.

Nsibirwa, supra note 26, at 51.
184.
Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 8, 14.
185.
This is a general reference to Maslow's "Hierarchy of Needs" theory, which
proposes that humans focus on and attempt to satisfy needs in a hierarchy beginning
with the most basic survival needs and ascending to higher needs of cognitive stimulus.
For a detailed explanation of the theory, see generally Abraham Maslow, A Theory of
Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (1943).

186.
Mary Rusimbi, Financing the Protocol: Considerations for Influencing
Budgets from Experiences in Tanzania, in BREATHING LIFE, supra note 4, at 38, 38.
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prioritize implementing its provisions.1 8 7 Other countries have
avoided signing the Protocol or considered taking substantial
reservations due to an observance of Islamic law, or shari'a, which
conflicts with many of the provisions of the Protocol.' 8 8
Even when a State Party has the best of intentions in ratifying
and implementing the provisions of the Protocol, there may be
internal institutional resistance. While certain traditional practices
89
appear to blatantly disregard established human rights norms,
some practices are not nearly as controversial, but still barred under
the Protocol. 190 As one member of the Zambian Parliament, Request
Muntanga, stated less than a year after his country's adoption of the
Protocol, the "so-called discrimination was God-made and would be
very difficult to get rid of."' 191 Another member concluded that
practices such as polygamy and lobolo (bride price) "are so deeply
rooted in the African consciousness that it would be impossible to
enforce any prohibition."'1 92 Accordingly, even if a country can bear
the economic burden of implementing the Protocol, it will likely
encounter friction between its obligations under the Protocol and its
citizens' desire to maintain cultural practices.
D. When Implementation Does Occur, but Is Ineffective,
Counter-Productiveor Not Enforced
Addressing the role of women in society, Eleanor Roosevelt
observed,

Cf. Sarah Mukasa, Domesticating the Protocol, in BREATHING LIFE, supra
187.
note 4, at 28, 32 (discussing "apathy and ambivalence" towards the Protocol and
similar initiatives by society at large and a "lack of awareness" of the Protocol by
leadership, "especially at local levels").
188.
See, e.g., Niger MPs, supra note 111 (noting Niger, a predominantly Muslim
country voted down the ratification of the Protocol); cf. Mary Wandia, Institutionalising
Strategies for the Protocol, in BREATHING LIFE, supra note 4, at 34, 36 (explaining how
religious legal systems can lead to legitimized violations of women's rights). Egypt and
Tunisia are examples of Muslim countries that have neither signed nor ratified the
Protocol. List of Protocol Signatories, supra note 4.
Here, I refer to female genital mutilation in particular which has been
189.
denounced by CEDAW, several UN groups and many women's rights groups. See, e.g.,
of Discrimination Against Women, General
Comm. on the Elimination
Sess. (1990), available at http://www.un.org/
Recommendation No. 14, 9th
AL.,
ET
WHO
womenwatchldaw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recoml4;
ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN INTERAGENCY STATEMENT 8 (2008),

available at http://www.who.int/reproductive-healthlpublications/fgm/fgm-statement2008.pdf.
Examples of these are polygamy and discrimination against women in the
190.
ownership and inheritance of property.
Customary, Statutory Law in Conflict, TIMES OF ZAMBIA (Ndolo), Feb. 18,
191.
2004.

192.
at 222.

MARRIAGE REPORT, supra note 170, § 2.1.11; Zimmerman, supra note 122,
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While it is true that women ... vote on the same terms as men ... too
often the great decisions are originated and given form in bodies made
up wholly of men, or so completely dominated by them that whatever of
special value women have to offer is shunted aside without expression.
Even in countries where for many years women have voted and been
eligible for public office, there are still too few women serving in
positions of real leadership. I am not talking now in terms of paper
parliaments and honorary appointments. Neither am I talking about
any such artificial balance as would be implied in a 50-50, or a 40-60
division of public offices. What I am talking about is whether women
are sharing in the direction of the policy making in their countries;
whether they have opportunities to serve as chairmen of important
committees and as cabinet ministers and delegates to the United
193
Nations.

Once a State Party ratifies the Protocol and incorporates the
provisions into domestic law, one might imagine that the country
would be well on its way to gender equality. All countries have an
affirmative obligation to adhere to the requirements of any treaty to
which they are a State Party. 194
However, how a country
implements, and later enforces, the provisions of the Protocol is
decisive.
As discussed above, a lack of implementation and
enforcement may indicate that a legally binding obligation is actually
non-binding. 195
However, if the provisions of the Protocol are
implemented and enforced inappropriately, the damage could be as
severe, if not worse, than if the Protocol had never been ratified. If
laws are not crafted carefully, they may not be effective in protecting
or prohibiting the behavior targeted by the lawmakers.
An
ambiguous law could allow abuses to continue. Worse still, certain
"affirmative action" or "quota-like" laws would have a stigmatizing
effect on women in the long-term. 196 Natalee Hevener identified
three phases of the development of women's rights law in her 1986
typology:
(1) the protective, in which women were not allowed to work in mines
197
and at night;

193.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 105 (citing Eleanor Roosevelt, U.N. Deliberations
on Draft Convention on the PoliticalRights of Women, DEP'T OF STATE BULLETIN, Jan.
5, 1953, at 29, reprinted in WHAT I HOPE TO LEAVE BEHIND: THE ESSENTIAL ESSAYS OF
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT (Allida M. Black ed., 1995), available at http://www.udhr.org!
history/124.htm).
194.
VCLT, supra note 56, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."). This is the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. Moreover, the treaty obligations will trump any national laws.
Article 27 of the VCLT provides, "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." Id. art. 27.
195.
See supra Part III.C-D.
196.
See Madeline E. Heilman, Affirmative Action: Some Unintended
Consequences for Working Women, 16 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 125 (1994)
(documenting the potential adverse effects of affirmative action on women in the
United States).
197.
See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 412 (1908).
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(2) the corrective, in which women wdre to be allowed to participate in
national politics and to retain their nationality without having to take
up that of their husbands; and
(3) the final stage, which was the equality or non-discrimination phase,
198
and which included the adoption of CEDAW.

Although, in theory, it would appear that the States Parties to the
Protocol have reached the third and final stage, in practice, the
implementation of certain articles reveals that many African
countries are in the "protective" or "corrective" phase. 199
1.

Article 9: Affirmative Action, Negative Reaction

"The Protocol . . . endorses affirmative action to promote the
equal participation of women, including equal representation of
women in elected office, and calls for the equal representation of
women in the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. '20 0 Article 9 of
the Protocol details the right of women to participate in the political
and decision making processes. 20 1 It specifically requires states to
"take specific positive action to promote participative governance and
the equal participation of women in the political life of their countries
through affirmative action. '20 2 The Protocol seeks to ensure that
women are permitted to participate in all elections, be represented
equally at all levels of the electoral processes, and be provided equal
status as men at all levels of development. 203 This ideal seems to be
replaced by a quota.
However, as written, the Protocol creates an artificial floor for
female representation. 20 4 It does not take into account that there

That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is
especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they
are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long
time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious
effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous
offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
Id. (emphasis added). Muller is an example of the paternalistic beginnings of the
women's rights movements. See id.
198.
Banda, supra note 63, at 243.
See, e.g., Ebeku, supra note 38, at 118, 121-22 (discussing implementation
199.
of the Protocol by Uganda, South Africa, and Zambia).
200.
Faiza Jama Mohamed, African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa: The SOAWR Campaign, in BREATHING LIFE, supranote 4, at 14, 14.
201.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 9.
202.
Id. art. 9(1) (emphasis added).
203.
Id. art. 9(1)(a)-(c).
204.
Gumisai Mutume, Women Break into African Politics: Quota Systems Allow
More Women to Gain Elected Office, AFR. RECOVERY, April 2004, at 4, available at
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vo118nol/181women.htm.
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may not be enough qualified or interested women candidates for
positions. It ignores the fact that many women (and men) are limited
from participating in elections not because of discrimination but
20 5
because of geography and poor infrastructure in the country.
"Equitable and equal do not, as the CEDAW committee has noted,
mean the same thing. States Parties should focus on the attainment
of substantive equality," 20 6 rather than on the creation of fixed quotas
for women in the political processes, a superficial equality.
Despite African women's "numerical strength," 20 7 women are
disenfranchised when it comes to participation in the political sphere,
a situation likely "related to their subordinate status under
customary international law." 208 As evidenced by statistics gathered
in 2004 by Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, women are poorly represented in the
decision making structures of their countries.20 9 "For instance,
despite their numerical superiority, women in Botswana constitute
only eighteen percent of the memberships of the National Assembly
(Parliament), thirteen percent of the Mayors, nineteen percent of the
members of the Local Government Councils, and thirty-three percent
In
of the members of the Executive Council (the Cabinet). '2 10
Nigeria, between 1999 and 2003, women held only 181 places (1.62%)
out of a total of 11,881 elected positions nationwide. 211 "More
specifically, of the 360 members of the House of Representatives,
there were only twelve women." 212
"Similarly, out of the 109
members of Senate, there were only three women." 2 13 Yet, "the
Protocol is clearly based on the presumptions that women's rights

205.

See generally Sonny Nwankwo & Darlington Richards, Institutional

Paradigmand the Management of Transitions:A Sub-Sahara African Perspective, 31
INT'L J. Soc. ECON. 111 (2004) (identifying geographical isolation and poor
infrastructure as interfering with forms of participation and communication in Africa).
206.
Banda, supra note 63, at 246.
207.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 94-95 (discussing population data indicating that
women comprise just over 50% of the population in countries like Nigeria, Ghana, and
Botswana and about 70% of the population in Rwanda, perhaps due to
disproportionately high deaths of men during the Rwandan genocide).
208.
Ebeku, supranote 38, at 95.

209.

Id.

210.
Id.; C.M. Fombad, The ConstitutionalProtectionAgainst Discriminationin
Botswana, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 139, 158 (2004).
211.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 95-96.
212.
Id.
213.
Id. The 2003 general elections in Nigeria produced a much worse picture
for women in public affairs. See UNITED NATIONS, THE WORLD'S WOMEN 2000: TRENDS
AND STATISTICS (2000) [hereinafter WORLD'S WOMEN].

See generally Why Nigerian

Women Fail in Elections, THIS DAY (Lagos), Sept. 30, 2007, available at
7
-WhyNigeria
http://www.awlproject.org/fileadmin/user-upload/News-Artices/3Spet
nWomenFailinElectionsThisDay.doc. For general statistics on female political
participation, see Women in Development Network, Statistics Africa, Labour,
www.focusintl.com/statrla4.htm#001 (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
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may not be given effective legal protections unless women participate
'2 14
in the development, interpretation, and enforcement of the law.
These low numbers, while a problem in and of themselves, are
also symptomatic of other, deeper patterns of marginalization. 215 In
response to these figures, some countries reserve positions for
women. 216 Under Rwanda's new, post-genocide constitution, 24 out of
80 seats in the lower house of parliament are reserved for women,
2 17
and 6 out of 20 seats in the upper house are reserved for women.
As a result, women now constitute 49% of the country's political
representation, topping a world average of 15%.218 Significantly,
during the country's September 2003 general election, an additional
fifteen women were voted into non-reserved seats-thus bringing a
total of thirty-nine women into the lower house. 219 "However, this
gain has been attributed to the role of women during and after the
country's civil war and not necessarily to a direct response to the
220
country's international obligations" under the Protocol.
221
Uganda also has adopted a gender-sensitive constitution.
Section 32(1) specifically provides for affirmative action in favor of
women, including affirmative action designed to address historical
inequality. 222 Section 33 provides:
1.

Women shall be accorded full and equal dignity with men.

2.

The State shall provide the facilities and opportunities necessary to
enhance the welfare of women to enable them to realize their full
potential and advancement.

3.

The State shall protect women and their rights, taking into account
their unique status and natural maternal functions in society.

This language mirrors the first and second phases in Hevener's
development of women's rights. Section 33(2) is protective; its
language is paternalistic and the provision would create a sheltered
status for the women. This creates a protected status-not an equal
status. 223 Section 33(3) is corrective, as well as protective. It was

214.
WORLD'S WOMEN, supra note 213.
215.
See Ebeku, supra note 38, at 86-93 (describing discrimination against
women inherent in African customary law).
216.
See, e.g., RWANDA CONST. arts. 76, 82 (2003) (reserving 24 seats in the
Chamber of Deputies and reserving 30 percent of seats in the Senate).
Id.
217.
218.
Mutume, supra note 204.
219.
Id.
220.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 124 n.105; Mutume, supra note 204. The
population is also about 70 percent female, which contributes to the higher
representation of women. Ebeku, supra note 38, at 95.
The Constitutions of Seychelles, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Namibia, Morocco,
221.
Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar and Rwanda are also gender-sensitive to differing degrees.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 118 n.94.
UGANDA CONST. art. 33 (1995).
222.
223.
The language of the Protocol is particularly noteworthy here for how it can
craft a status or create discrimination rather than respond to it. Anne Hellum writes:
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specifically because the Banjul Charter was considered to only protect
women in the maternal context that the Protocol was considered
224
necessary.
Other significant documents like the Protocol to the Treaty
Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PanAfrican Parliament and CEDAW also rely on affirmative action
programs for female representation. 2 25 Article 4(2) of the Protocol to
the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to
the Pan-African Parliament provides that "each Member State shall
be represented in the Pan-African Parliament by five (5) members, at
least one of whom MUST be a woman." 2 26 Under CEDAW, in order to
achieve de facto equality between men and women, the treaty permits
positive discrimination, 2 27 specifically allowing for the "adoption of
temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality
'22 8
between men and women shall not be considered discrimination.
While affirmative action programs have been shown to increase
the representation of women in political offices, these programs
ultimately risk hurting women. Portraying women as in need of
protection and coddling affirms the image of women as weak and
subordinate. Providing rights on the basis of a woman's "natural
maternal functions" limits the roles women can expect to fill in the
future.2 29 Finally, mandating equal representation, regardless of a

[m]ore recent studies have gone beyond the de jure equality-de facto
discrimination dichotomy of international to examine how law itself, in terms of
legal texts, creates gender boundaries and categories. The British scholar
Carol Smart has argued that law should be analyzed as a process of producing
fixed gender identities rather than as the application of gender-neutral law to
previously gendered subjects. Analysis of how legal texts define concepts like
marriage is seen as the first step in dissolving boundaries between law and
other aspects of society and facilitating creative thinking about the power that
law exercises in women's lives.
See Hellum, supra note 150, at 639.
224.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 125.
225.
Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community
Relating to the Pan-African Parliament art. 4(2), Mar. 2, 2001, OAU Doc. EAHG/3 (V),
available at http://www.africanreview.org/docs/civsoc/pap.pdf
[hereinafter Protocol
Establishing African Economic Community]; CEDAW, supra note 42, art. 4.
226.
Protocol Establishing African Economic Community, supra note 225, art.
4(2).
227.
CEDAW, supra note 42, art. 4; Ebeku, supra note 38, at 102.
228.
CEDAW, supra note 42, art. 4; Ebeku, supra note 28, at 102. Currently 185
countries-more than ninety percent of the members of the United Nations-are
parties to the CEDAW. U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, State Parties to CEDAW, http://www.un.org/womenwatch
daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited Mar 28, 2009).
229.
See Fitnat Naa-Adjeley Adjetey, Reclaiming the African Woman's
Individuality: The Struggle Between Women's Reproductive Autonomy and African
Society and Culture, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1351, 1353 (1995) (discussing the woman's role
in African customary law as a mother and object, first and foremost).
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woman's availability or qualifications stigmatizes the women who fill
those positions, and ultimately, women as a group. 230 Requiring
equal representation may act as a de facto "cap" on the number of
women who can be elected and mark the women who do serve as
"unqualified. ' 23 1 An affirmative action program may increase the
number of female faces in the decision making bodies of a country,
but it will not allow men and women to be viewed as equal.
2.

Women Do Not Have to Speak with a Unified Voice

Perhaps the most harmful aspect of the affirmative action plans
is the underlying assumption that a few women can speak for all
women. 2 32 As with any diverse group, women have a range of
233
experiences, customs, and most importantly, perspectives.
African women cannot be said to possess monolithic and shared
interests falling neatly along and between the tracks I have laid [of the
women's rights movement]. If invited and empowered to speak, it is
unclear what 'they' will articulate, or even if 'they' will articulate
23 4
anything as a coherent collective.

Indeed, women can be just as harmful to the movement as men. In a
study of a popular court outside Maputo, Mozambique, Aase
Gundersen and Nina Berg observed and interviewed judges and
parties to show how the elected lay-judges merged customs, socialist
values, constitutional principles of gender equality, and practical
considerations in their exercise of the "good sense and justice"

230.
Affirmative action posed the same program in the Draft as well. Formerly,
Article 10(1)(b) instead of Article 9, the Draft Protocol required that women be equally
represented in all elections. This did not take into consideration issues such as
women's qualifications and availability as office-bearers. Martin Semalulu Nsibirwa
writes:
It rather aim[ed] at achieving a balance based on the sex of individuals.
Because of this, Article 10(1)(b) would be seen as controversial in many
countries. While the problems of women need to be addressed, caution has to
be exercised in the approached that is used. Attention should rather be focused
on ensuring that people in offices of authority are gender sensitive and aware of
the problems that women face.
Nsibirwa, supra note 25, at 51-52.
231.
See Mutume, supra note 204 ("[Wlomen who come into power under such a
system may be undervalued or viewed as not politically deserving.").
232.
See Zimmerman, supra note 122, at 227. •
233.
In Swahili culture, for instance, gender-specific norms guide proper social
behavior. Heshima, a cultural understanding to minimize conflict, counsels women to
handle domestic problems through silence and men, through legal speech. Other
women may have had a completely different cultural or life. Hellum, supra note 150, at
645.
234.
Zimmerman, supranote 122, at 227.
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guidelines embodied in the Law on Judicial Organization. 235 The
study showed considerable variation in outcome.2 36 Interestingly, it
was often the female judges who, as middle-aged members of the
women's wing, would criticize women who failed to perform their
domestic duties. 23 7 "As such, women acted as the upholders of
23 8
patriarchal customs and practices.
Ironically, women's participation in the women's rights discourse
is limited by the perceived roles they can fill: if a woman supports
customary practice she is viewed as backwards or uneducated, but if
she promotes statutory law she is dismissed as being a mouthpiece
for a "hegemonic western orthodoxy. '239 As such, allowing women to
contribute as individuals rather than as token voices or a
marginalized movement is not assisted by the implementation of
affirmative action programs. A woman's voice as an individual,
rather than as part of a class, group or status, is hampered by the
240
representation provisions of the Protocol.
The Protocol was drafted and ratified with the best of
intentions. 24 1 It engages States Parties in a dialogue about women's
rights and forces them to grapple with customary and statutory law
in domestic contexts. Although flawed in its execution, it endeavors
to redress the plight of women and empower them in the private and
public arenas. The first attempts at finding States Parties to ratify,
implement, and enforce the Protocol have been admirable and, in
many ways, a cognizable success. 242 However, if the Protocol is truly
to embody the desiderata of law for the women's rights movement,
the implementation and enforcement of its provisions cannot continue
243
in the aforementioned manner.

IV. IT'S TIME TO DROP THE IMAGINARY MANTLE: HOW TO
FIX THE PROTOCOL
Speaking generally, inequalities exist in all societies. Many persons
are excluded from full participation on the basis of categorical

235.
Hellum, supra note 150, at 648 (referencing Nina Berg & Aase Gundersen,
Legal Reforms in Mozambique: Equality and Emancipation through PopularJustice?,
in GENDER AND CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 266 (Kristi Anne Stolen &
Mariken Vaa, eds., 1991)).
236.
Id.
237.
Id.
238.
Id. at 649.
239.
SUSAN E. HIRSCH, PRONOUNCING AND PERSEVERING: GENDER AND THE
DISCOURSES OF DISPUTING IN AN AFRICAN ISLAMIC COURT 360 (1998).
240.
Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 8(e), 9(2).

241.
The author here is reminded of the old adage: "The road to Hell is paved
with good intentions."
242.
Houghton, supra note 95.
243.
See supraPart III.C-D.
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differences .... The noble words of the United Nations Charter - that
the UN shall promote 'universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion' - remain unrealized. For change to come,
efforts will be necessary both from inside particular societies and from
244
outside them.

In order for women's position in Africa to improve, change must
be internal as well as external and executed from the top-down and
bottom-up. "The disconnection between the pronouncements made at
the regional level, and the action taken nationally and locally,
demonstrates that the road to domestication and implementation is
riddled with challenges that will have to be overcome if the [P]rotocol
is to benefit the women it seeks to protect. '245 The Protocol was a
good step in the right direction for an external, top-down adjustment,
but, as evidenced by the obstacles it has and will continue to
encounter in its application, the revolution is incomplete. States
Parties now must focus on a bottom-up, internal modification to truly
effectuate the changes aspired to in the Protocol.
A. Failing to Look in the Mirror:The Status Quo
There are multiple ways in which to address the inadequacies of
the current state of the Protocol. The current implementation of the
Protocol has proven to be incomplete. Maintaining the status quo
involves little more than allowing States Parties to "copy and paste"
the language of the Protocol into their countries' laws and sit back
and wait for society to change. As discussed already, this is an
extremely risky path and unlikely to result in any substantial,
beneficial changes in the near future. 246 Moreover, this path relies on
a trickle-down method of change and the passage of time and shifting
of cohorts for real change to occur. By implementing foreign laws and
norms in the domestic setting, the Protocol would impose an external
influence on a community with little regard for the desires and
interests of its people. Moreover, the laws are created and applied
from the top-down. The citizens to whom the laws will be applied
need an opportunity to respond and shape the laws for the most
effective transformation to take place. A close inspection of the status
quo and how States Parties are currently implementing the Protocol
will quickly reveal that it has not been as successful as originally
imagined.

244.
Claude E. Welch, Jr., Human Rights in Francophone West Africa, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supranote 62, at 184, 206.
245.
Sarah Mukasa, Domesticating the Protocol, in BREATHING LIFE, supra note
4, at 28, 28.
246.
See supra Part III.
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B. Women's Rights EducationProgramsand Advocacy
Conferences: The Ministers' Opinions
The Protocol calls upon States Parties to ensure the education of
women concerning their guaranteed rights. 247 Many NGOs and
governments have responded to the obligations under the Protocol by
developing programs to increase voting by women and improve
regional education about women's rights laws. 248 "Protection will be
contingent on the one hand on the wider climate of opinion and
attitude of judges, and on the other hand, on the rigorous training of
women's rights activists and organizations. 2 4 9 While the education
programs are laudable and should be continued, they are yet another
example of a top-down, external approach to implementing the
Protocol.
The purpose of the Protocol is to engage States Parties and their
citizenry in a discussion about women's rights;2 50 an education
program about women's rights only exerts external, often
Westernized, pressure on a community. As one scholar observed, "[i]t
is because the Protocol seeks to redress the power equation in gender
relations, and to significantly alter the status quo, that resistance to
it on all levels is to be expected. ' 251 However, it is not simply because
the Protocol seeks to alter the status quo that individuals are
hesitant to recognize the laws.
The Protocol implicitly tells
communities that their histories are wrong, immoral, and illegal. An
education program reinforcing this message is clearly going to be met
with disdain.
Education programs and conferences on women's rights are tools
for spreading a message to individuials who had either little input in
the discourse or all the input in the discourse.
As Josephine
Ouedraogo of Burkina Faso argues, the key reason why gender
equality in Africa is still "only on paper" is that gender structures
remain marginal and the same casts of characters (mainly women)
come to regional and global conferences on women. 25 2 She declared:
"We are talking to ourselves .... We are still not working in the
mainstream - targeting ... the people who make policies critical to
'253
the achievement of gender equality.
One cannot ask only the drafters of the Protocol or the organizers
of education programs how they think women's rights should be

247.
248.

Systems,
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 8-9, 12, 17.
Id.; Ibrahima Kane, Harmonising the Protocol with National Legal
in BREATHING LIFE, supra hote 4, at 51, 57.
Kane, supra note 248, at 57.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2(2).
Mukasa, supra note 187, at 29.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 135.
Id.
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implemented; this would be tautological and self-congratulatory.
Education programs only spread the Protocol's ideology; they do not
interact with the community to learn its perspective. Similarly,
Conferences only echo pre-existing ideas. While conferences and local
programs are a good idea in general, they cannot be the only
approach taken to implement the Protocol. In appraising his mystical
new clothes, the Emperor foolishly relied only on the tailors who
created them and his lackeys who praised them; in contrast, the
Protocol must look past its rhetoric and the ambitions of its framers
and speak to the communities it is meant to protect.
C. Listening to the Child in the Crowd: The Grass Roots Approach
States Parties need to consider a way to implement the Protocol,
starting from the bottom-up and within their countries. Experts and
NGOs need to move beyond anthropological studies and human rights
discourse; the former observes and reports back and the latter
projects its morals upon the target audience. 254 To holistically and
effectively implement the Protocol, it is necessary to complement the
already-present, top-down, external forms of implementation with
bottom-up, internal dialogue about the living law. To implement the
Protocol effectively, NGOs and governments need to work together to
survey communities and find out the underlying values behind
controversial practices. There is a true need for a dialogue to exist
where all viewpoints can be expressed.
Although the contributions of the NGOs during the drafting of
the Protocol were vital, they represented generally, homogenous

254.
Welch, an anthropologist, tends to favor a top-down, internal approach
when reconciling statutory and customary law with each other. While Welch proposes
three steps to encouraging human rights, he skims over the basic solution too quickly
with an emphasis on a top-down complement to these efforts. Welch proposes: (1)
individual societies must be "examined to uncover concepts relevant to human rights:
the worth and dignity of individuals, and obligations or duties to others (both within
and outside the particular group);" (2) indigenous institutions must be studied and (3)
"patterns uncovered widely throughout an entire African state should be compared to
find elements of commonality, which form part of the national as contrasted with the
ethnic sets of values." Welch, supra note 244, at 206.
Moreover, Welch incorrectly concludes that
In the short run, civil and political rights in contemporary West Africa are
affected far more by persons in power than by values held within the social
communities or by pressures brought to bear from external governments and
organization

. . . . The ultimate

focus

must be the establishment of a

government of laws, not of men.
Id. As is addressed in the body of this Note, the basic solution is to complement topdown, external forms of implementation with bottom-up, internal dialogue about the
living law.
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viewpoints. 255 Rural and informally educated communities effectively
were excluded from these conversations for a multitude of reasons
256
(e.g., poor infrastructure, lack of knowledge, lack of funding, etc.).
Thus, the Protocol was drafted in an echo chamber of women's rights
advocates with little offered as a counter-balance. However, now that
the Protocol is being implemented, some communities perceive its
norms as foreign and unwanted. 257 It is because of this initial
exclusion that there exists a need for cross-cultural dialogue. The
goal of such engagement is to
raise moral voices across societal lines, to further advance the
Rather
development of a significant core of globally shared values ....
than muting the cross-cultural moral voice as the [ethical] relativists
do, all societies should respect the rights of others to lay moral claims
258
on them just as they are entitled to lay claims on others.

Only after the discussion has been broached in this manner may the
next step be taken. This next step entails developing laws that
respect the values of customary law, but aim to fulfill the provisions
of the Protocol. "Women lead challenging and complex lives, and
there are no easy solutions, no quick fixes. All African people must
play a role in advocating the rights of women and recognize that the
solutions are as diverse as the communities and cultures in which
they live."'2 59 If the development of law is considered a process where
facts, norms, and behavior are closely interwoven, then it is
important to have obtained all the facts. 260 Griffiths and Hirsh
particularly emphasized the need to go beyond textual and historical
analyses and instead pay attention to "how norms and considerations
regulating male and female behavior and access to resources is
negotiated in the intersection between a wide variety of formal and
As
informal norms in different contexts and settings." 261
anthropologists, Griffith and Hirsch stopped short of pursuing change
262
in the communities, instead observing and learning about them.

255.
See supra Part II.E regarding the simultaneous creation of different
protocol drafts with the same goals and overlapping aims of protecting women.
256.
See supra note 81, for a list of the organizations that were involved in the
drafting of the Protocol.
See, e.g., Rachel Sheier, Rights Treaty in Uganda Snags on "African
257.
Values," WOMEN'S ENEWS, June 2, 2008, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/
aid/3619 (noting that some in Uganda criticized parts of the Protocol for its "import of
western values").
258.
Diana Fox, Anthropology and Women's Human Rights: Perspectives on
Relativism and Universality, in THE CHALLENGES OF WOMEN'S ACTMSM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN AFRICA 39, 51 (Diana Fox & Naima Hasci eds., 1999) (internal quotation
omitted).
259.
Kemp, supra note 97, at 8.
260.
Hellum, supra note 150, at 639.
261.
Id.
262.
Id.
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Despite cultural differences, Griffith and
remarkable underlying similarities, noting:

Hirsch

uncovered

[W]ithin individual African cultures . . . opportunity exists for
employing indigenous values in the interest of universally defined
human rights. Conceptions essential to human rights - for example,
responsibility toward others, participation, or respect for ways of life exist in contemporary African societies. Civil and political rights are
influenced by the underlying social values of compromise, harmony
without concurrent uniformity, and tolerance of diversity. Grafts on
local roots of this sort seem destined to mature and flower more
263
robustly than alien transplants into inhospitable soil.

Opening up a true dialogue with the communities of States Parties
will make the implementation of the Protocol more amenable for all
involved.
Initiating a dialogue between those who are in charge of
implementing the Protocol and those who will abide by its laws is a
weighty task that will require time, money and cooperation.
It is usually conceded that appropriate measures to understand, define,
and secure these objectives require a much greater involvement of those
whose interests are most at stake, and that nongovernmental
organizations of various kinds, working with rural communities, should
play a greater role in helping to identify and articulate the concerns,
264
needs, and requirements of smallholder households.

A truly participatory process would legitimize rural and
disenfranchised voices. 265 Although costly and likely to raise issues as
to how competing cultural perspectives are to be weighted and
reconciled with one another, this is not a conversation that can be
266
ignored.
To encourage the recognition of the rights vested in the Protocol,
the drafters need to reframe the task: currently, the right to tradition
and culture (customary law) and the right to equal treatment
(statutory law) are discursively pitted against each other in rural
Africa. 26 7
The task should not be teaching statutory law or
condemning customary law. The implementation of the Protocol
should focus on the successes of living law and the similar underlying
values codified in the statutory law and customary practice.
Although some courts have been hesitant to embrace living law as a
third perspective in the struggle, 2 68 reinforcing this third source of

263.
264.
265.
at 215.
266.
267.
268.
Mthembu
survey of

Welch, supranote 244, at 206.
Paul, supra note 62, at 228.
MARRIAGE REPORT, supra note 170, § 2.2.12; Zimmerman, supra note 122,
Id.
Zimmerman, supranote 122, at 198.
South Africa, for instance, rejected the use of a survey of living law. When
came before Judge Mynhardt, counsel for the defendant suggested that a
current views on judicial development of succession practices be conducted
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law with surveys, interviews, and a deeper understanding of the
nexus of customary and statutory law could effectively complement
the implementation of the Protocol.
To develop laws that will be respected by the community, the
governments of States Parties need to start by asking the
communities not only about the Protocol but also about the values
and desires enmeshed in living law. Simply put, the communities
affected by the Protocol have been elided from the development of the
Protocol and its implementation. If the Protocol is to be effectively
and fairly implemented in a way that will assist women now and in
the future, the States Parties must recognize the values of the
communities upon which the laws will be imposed.
D. Knowing When to End the Parade:Other Useful Revisions
to the Protocol
There comes a point when it must be accepted that a policy or
law is ineffective or harmful to the cause. Sometimes it is more
foolish to continue down the wrong path, expecting a different or
better result, than to admit to a poor choice and start over. Although
the bulk of this Note has focused on how the Protocol's
implementation can be improved, some States Parties have already
269
incorporated the Protocol goals into their domestic legislation.
Other countries are still teetering on the edge of ratifying the
Protocol, debating which reservations to make. 270 Furthermore, in
time, all the States Parties may conclude that certain aspects of the
2 71
Protocol need to be amended.
It is of particular import that States Parties be prompted to shift
away from the "affirmative action" language in the Protocol. "To
comply with international human rights standards, many African
governments are gradually replacing their gender-specific and familybased customary and religious laws with new legislation molded on
an individualistic, equal-status ideal. '2 72 "One of the fundamental
obstacles to women's equality is that de facto discrimination and
inequality in the status of women and men derive from larger social,
economic, political, and cultural factors that have been justified on
the basis of physiological differences. '2 73 Affirmative action programs

but Mynhardt rejected the idea. Mthembu v. Letsela 1998 (2) SA 675 (T.P.D.) at 685 (S.
Afr.). The South African Law Commission also rejected suggestions to ascertain the
living law. MARRIAGE REPORT, supra note 170, §§ 2.2.10-13.
269.
See, e.g., South Africa, Kenya, and Botswana, as discussed supranote 90.
270.
See, e.g., Niger MPs, supra note 111.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 30; VCLT, supra note 56, arts. 39-41 (general
271.
rules on amending treaties).
272.
Hellum, supra note 150, at 635.
273.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 110; see World Conference to Review and Appraise
the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development,
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only complicate the matter by stigmatizing women and artificially
274
advancing the "voice" of women through token representation.
While individual governments are responsible for providing for
women's rights in their constitutions, 275 affirmative action plans
attempt to consolidate feminist concerns beyond an appropriate point.
Moreover, because of the varied, statutory methods of implementing
the Protocol that are frequently abrogated by contradictory and
conflicting customary law, the implementation process has not been
276
consistent.
It is the responsibility of the States Parties to ensure that the
Protocol's protections are in place for all women. 277 This will require
the creation of new laws, coordination by NGOs and the government,
and a significant investment of time, resources and money. However,
it will also require humility. At times, a country may select a method
for implementing the Protocol that is ineffective or even harmful. It
is important that a State Party is able to accept when it has made a
mistake and make efforts to rectify the situation, rather than
foolishly continue the procession unclad.

V. CONCLUSION
On the whole, it is clear that the adoption of the African Protocol on
Women's Rights per se does not and will not necessarily translate to an
end to the problem of abuse of women's rights in Africa nor does it
necessarily mean the attainment of gender equality and nondiscrimination.

278

An instrument addressing women's rights was in some ways
necessary. The present condition of women in Africa cannot be
allowed to continue. However, the Protocol as it is currently written
and being implemented poses veiled risks for women. Failure to
enforce the Protocol may undermine opinio juris on the Protocol's
binding effect-that it is acceptable that no one can see the invisible
"cloth." However, implementing the Protocol ineffectively through
stigmatizing and limiting affirmative action plans will have a more
damaging effect on women: it tacitly condones sauntering through
crowds in the buffl

and Peace, July 15-26, 1985, Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement
of Women (NFLS), 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/108 (Dec. 13, 1985) (describing the reasons
and need for focusing on the advancement of women).
See supra Part III.D.
274.
Rita Anyumba, Instruments on Women's Rights, in BREATHING LIFE, supra
275.
note 4, at 9, 11.
See supra Part III.B-D.
276.
277.
Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2.
278.
Ebeku, supra note 38, at 135.
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Although the Emperor is more than entitled to purchase a new
wardrobe of magical material, he should seek more than the advice of
his servile ministers and those personally invested in the success of
the new clothes. Similarly, the successful implementation of the
Protocol requires input from a circle larger than the drafters and
women's rights community.
In any case, if women step out of their prescribed social roles in Africa,
they will not do so because of the philosophy of human rights. The
existence of human rights as a philosophy has a marginal effect on
large-scale social structural change, which it cannot in and of itself
either stem or impel. But the principle of human rights can modify the
effects of social change in manners compatible with the wishes of
individuals who define themselves both as members of communities
and as persons with their own particular wants and needs. It can also
protect individuals and communities against abuses by ruling classes
279
and the state; this is its chief and most compelling object.

It is the oft-ignored voices in the community-the children in the
crowd-who should be consulted before the Emperor selects and pays
for his suit. If the Protocol is to have any long-term success in
promoting women's rights and resolving the conflict between
statutory and customary law, the States Parties must complement its
current efforts with a grass-roots approach to developing the law.
The current measures have been developed externally and
implemented from the top-down, but it is time that the crowd and the
Emperor alike listen to the child before proceeding any further. The
Protocol as written and currently implemented risks putting women
in a socially and politically more precarious position than before, and
unless a more comprehensive, bottom-up approach is taken to
developing the domestic laws for implementation, women in Africa
will remain exposed-and the Emperor will remain naked.
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